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What is Liberalism? 
Duncan Bell (University of Cambridge) 
 
Like the history of anything else, history of philosophy is written by the victors. 
Victors get to choose their ancestors, in the sense that they decide which among 
their all too various ancestors to mention, write biographies of, and commend to 
their descendants. (Richard Rorty)1 
 
Before we can begin to analyze any specific form of liberalism we must surely 
state as clearly as possible what the word means. For in the course of so many 
years of ideological conflict it seems to have lost its identity completely. Overuse 
and overextension have rendered it so amorphous that it can now serve as an all-
purpose word, whether of abuse or praise. (Judith Shklar)2 
 
Introduction 
Liberalism is a spectre that haunts Western political thought and practice. For some it is a site of 
the modern, an object of desire, even the telos of history. For others it represents an unfolding 
nightmare, signifying either the vicious logic of capitalism or a squalid descent into moral 
relativism. For others still, perhaps the majority, it is a mark of ambivalence, the ideological 
prerequisite for living a reasonably comfortable life in affluent democratic states – the least worst 
option. 
But what is liberalism? Across and within scholarly discourses it is construed in manifold and 
contradictory ways: as an embattled vanguard project and constitutive of modernity itself, a fine-
grained normative political philosophy and a hegemonic mode of governmentality, the 
justificatory ideology of unrestrained capitalism and the richest ideological resource for its 
limitation. Self-declared liberals have supported extensive welfare states and their abolition; the 
imperial civilizing mission and its passionate denunciation; the necessity of social justice and its 
outright rejection; the perpetuation of the sovereign state and its transcendence; massive global 
redistribution of wealth and the radical inequalities of the existing order. Shklar’s complaint that 
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it is an “all-purpose word” is thus unsurprising, for liberalism has become the metacategory of 
Western political discourse. 
There are several responses to “overextension”. One is simply to ignore it, deploying the term as 
if its meaning was self-evident. Ubiquitous across the humanities and social sciences, this 
unreflective impulse generates much confusion. Another is to engage in “boundary work” – to 
demarcate and police the discourse.3 Some influential attempts to do so have figured liberalism 
as a capacious tradition of traditions, with Guido De Ruggiero and Friedrich Hayek, for example, 
bifurcating it into British and Continental forms. The most common variation on this theme is 
to distinguish “classical” and “social” liberalisms.4 Another popular response is to narrate liberal 
history as a story of rise or decline, triumph or tragedy. A familiar rendition bemoans the lost 
purity of the original. Thus Leo Strauss mourned the transition from virtuous “ancient” 
liberalism (reaching its apogee in Athens) to debased forms of “modern” liberalism 
(commencing with Machiavelli), while Sheldon Wolin averred that twentieth-century liberalism 
had disastrously forgotten its early sceptical enunciation.5 Some neoconservatives have claimed 
the mantle, seeking, with Irving Kristol, “a return to the original sources of liberal vision and 
liberal energy so as to correct the warped version”.6 Declension has also been a recurrent 
libertarian complaint. When he came to pen his defence of “classical” liberalism in 1927, Ludwig 
von Mises grumbled that from Mill onwards the ideology had degenerated into socialism, a 
warning that Herbert Spencer had flagged half a century earlier.7 But the development of 
liberalism can also be cast as progressive. Both L.T Hobhouse and John Dewey, for example, 
celebrated the transfiguration of liberalism from an ideology of laissez faire to the use of 
systematic government intervention to reduce harmful disadvantages.8 The argument continues 
today with many libertarians viewing “social” liberalism as a deplorable form of socialism and 
many social liberals rejecting the liberal credentials of libertarianism. All sides claim to be heirs of 
the one true liberalism. 
A related policing strategy is to concede the intellectual diversity of liberalism while extracting its 
constitutive element(s) – its ineliminable core. This too is contested terrain. Adopting the most 
common line, Shklar sought to create a “modest amount of order” by characterising liberalism as 
a “political doctrine” with “only one overriding aim: to secure the political conditions that are 
necessary for the exercise of personal freedom”.9 Jeremy Waldron rightly observes that to 
identify a commitment to freedom as the foundation of liberalism “is to say something too vague 
and abstract to be helpful”, and he proposes instead that it is best defined by a “requirement that 
all aspects of the social should either be made acceptable or be capable of being made acceptable 
to every last individual”.10 Ronald Dworkin asserts that “a certain conception of equality…is the 
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nerve of liberalism.”11 Others insist on a cluster of commitments. The historian Gary Gerstle, for 
example, suggests that liberals have always endorsed three “foundational principles”, rationality, 
emancipation, and progress, while John Dunn once lamented the “dismaying number of 
categories” thought central to liberal ideology, including political rationalism, hostility to 
autocracy, cultural distaste for conservatism and tradition, tolerance, and individualism.12 Even 
its supposed core has proven rather elusive.  
 
In what follows I neither attempt to adjudicate between these competing interpretations nor 
present a new substantive liberal theory. Instead, I seek to reframe the way in which the liberal 
tradition is understood. I open with a critique of some existing interpretive protocols used to 
delimit political traditions, before introducing (in Section II) a new way of conceptualizing 
liberalism, suggesting that it can be seen as the sum of the arguments that have been classified as 
liberal, and recognised as such by other self-proclaimed liberals, across time and space. In the 
second half of the essay I analyse the emergence and subsequent transformation of the category 
of liberalism in Anglo-American political thought between 1850 and 1950. This serves as an 
illustrative case study of some of the methodological arguments I outline in the first two 
sections. While Section III traces the evolution of the language of liberalism in nineteenth 
century Britain, Section IV explores how the scope of the liberal tradition was massively 
expanded during the middle decades of the century, chiefly in the United States, such that it 
came to be seen by many as the constitutive ideology of the West. Above all, I contend that this 
capacious understanding of liberalism was produced by a conjunction of the ideological wars 
fought against “totalitarianism” and assorted developments in the social sciences. Today we both 
inherit and inhabit it.  
 
Constructing Liberalism: Scholarly Purposes and Interpretive Protocols 
There are at least three types of answer that can be given to the question in the title, each of 
which serves a different scholarly purpose. Prescriptive responses specify norms of correct or best 
usage. They delineate a particular conception of liberalism, branding it as more authentic – more 
truly liberal – than other claimants to the name. Such accounts vary in the core features 
recognized as constitutive, the interpretive methodologies utilised to identify them, and the 
normative stance assumed towards them. This is the most familiar type of answer, not least in 
contemporary political theory. Comprehensive responses attempt to chart the plethora of liberal 
languages. Rather than prescribing a favoured conception they seek to identify the actual range of 
usage, mapping the variegated topography of liberal ideology. These accounts vary in the 
interpretive methodologies employed and the temporal and spatial scope of enquiry. Explanatory 
responses account for the development of liberalism(s), whether understood in prescriptive or 
comprehensive terms. They too vary in methodology and scope. Although each kind of response 
is legitimate in certain circumstances, problems arise when they are misapplied or conflated. In 
particular, prescriptive accounts are very poor guides to understanding the internal complexity 
and historical development of ideologies. 
Furthermore, scholars adopt different methodological strategies – interpretive protocols – to answer 
the question. To argue about a political tradition – to compare and contrast it; to chart its 
decline, crisis, or ascension; to pinpoint its flaws or celebrate its strengths – it is first necessary to 
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construct it as an object of analysis. Political theorists typically employ one of two main 
protocols: stipulative and canonical. Contextualism offers an alternative.13 
Stipulative accounts identify necessary (though rarely sufficient) conditions for a position to count 
as a legitimate exemplar of a tradition. “Liberalism” is typically constructed from interpretations 
of the meaning and inter-relation of core concepts, such as liberty, authority, autonomy, and 
equality. Such accounts employ definitional fiat to demarcate the legitimate boundaries of 
liberalism, insisting that only those committed to a particular set of views count as properly 
liberal. We have already encountered the contrasting formulations offered by Dworkin, Gerstle, 
Shklar, and Waldron. History is sometimes invoked in such accounts, but it is usually what Rawls 
aptly terms the “philosopher’s schematic version of speculative history”, and while these 
arguments often cite historical figures – above all Locke, Kant, Mill, and now Rawls himself – 
their core normative arguments can be justified independently of any past expression.14  
Traditions are usually constructed around a canon of renowned thinkers, which serves 
simultaneously as a reservoir of arguments, an index of historical continuity, and a powerful 
source of intellectual authority. Canonical approaches thus distil “liberal” theoretical structures 
from exemplary writings. The most frequent targets for this protocol are (again) Locke, Kant, 
Mill, and Rawls, though a host of other figures are sometimes marshalled to fit the occasion. Leo 
Strauss and his epigones have divined sweeping interpretations of liberal modernity from a 
handful of “great books.” Pierre Manent, for instance, charts the unfolding of liberalism through 
a procession of figures stretching back to Machiavelli and Hobbes.15 Far from being an exclusive 
Straussian strategy, however, this is arguably the most common protocol for constructing 
liberalism. To take one prominent recent debate, canonical formulations are central to arguments 
about the relationship between liberalism and empire. While Uday Singh Mehta grounds his 
influential argument that liberalism has an “urge” to empire on readings of Locke and Mill, most 
rejoinders have likewise focused on canonical figures.16  
Both of these methodological strategies are valuable, even essential, for achieving particular 
scholarly aims. Stipulative protocols can be fruitfully employed in the construction of normative 
political philosophies and the elaboration of ideal types for conducting social analysis. Canonical 
scholarship, meanwhile, can generate insightful readings of individual thinkers. But neither are 
capable of underwriting plausible comprehensive or explanatory accounts as they cannot shed 
much light on the universe of liberal languages, the plethora of competing and often 
contradictory claims that travel under its name. Articulated in the register of philosophical 
abstraction, the stipulative genre is estranged from the vicissitudes of history and political 
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practice. It is caught on the horns of a dilemma. Unless the stipulated commitments are 
conceptualised at a very high level of generality – e.g. that liberalism prioritises individual 
freedom, or that liberals are committed to toleration, liberty and constitutional government – 
they will invariably fail to encompass the deep divisions between professed variants of liberalism, 
yet when pitched at that level they provide little guidance for pursuing the detailed 
reconstruction necessary for satisfactory description or explanation. Waldron’s argument 
illustrates this mismatch. Maintaining that only those adopting his contracturalist view of 
justification count as properly liberal, he anoints Locke, Rousseau and Kant as genuine liberals, 
while suggesting that John Stuart Mill and numerous other nineteenth-century figures (especially 
utilitarians) stand in an “ambiguous relation” to the tradition. On this account, then, liberalism 
simultaneously pre-exists its own self-conscious formulation and was misunderstood by many of 
those who played a fundamental role in its propagation. At least he admits that “many liberals 
may not recognise” the picture he paints.17  
The problem with canonical protocols is that they can rarely support the generalisations they are 
invoked to underpin. As Mehta’s argument shows, work in this vein often seems to assume that 
the ideas of canonical figures can stand in for, or be seen as sufficiently representative of, the 
tradition as a whole. Despite claims to the contrary, this provides a defective foundation on 
which to build an analysis of a tradition. Given the internal diversity of liberalism, its national 
and regional variation, and its polyvocal evolution, it is exceptionally difficult to ground felicitous 
non-trivial generalisations on the work of a handful of authors. A further problem is that this 
protocol often takes as given the very thing which should be investigated – the construction of 
the canon. The idea of a canon of great thinkers standing at the heart of a pre-constituted 
tradition is, in part, an artefact of the professional development of academic political theory 
during the twentieth century.18 It is the product of a particular moment in time, shaped by largely 
forgotten value-commitments and selection criteria, and arguments centred on claims distilled 
from the canon are thus conducted within a discursive echo-chamber. Indeed studying the 
processes through which the canon crystallised can reveal as much (or more) about the dynamics 
of political thinking as the forensic analysis of purportedly exemplary texts. 
Contextualist approaches to the history of political thinking need little introduction.19 The bulk of 
such work has focused on illuminating the patterns of early modern political thinking, and there 
are no general contextual histories of liberalism – indeed its methodological precepts render such 
a project quixotic. Contextualists have nevertheless made an important contribution to the 
analysis of liberalism by challenging the assumption that it can be traced to the seventeenth 
century. Versions of this argument have been tendered by John Dunn, Mark Goldie, J.G.A. 
Pocock, Quentin Skinner, and James Tully. Pocock, for example, maintains that  “liberalism” 
was “not used in the eighteenth century, where the adjective ‘liberal’ did not bear its modern 
meaning, and though elements were present which would in due course be assembled by means 
of this formula, there was no system of doctrine corresponding to its later use”.20 Thus no 
significant inferences about liberalism can be drawn from the earlier period. In particular, this 
strand of scholarship has repeatedly questioned Locke’s elevated status as a (or the) foundational 
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liberal.21 It is important to recognise that this is not principally a semantic argument about the 
absence of the word “liberalism”, but rather a claim about the range of concepts and arguments 
available to historical actors.22 It is about extant thought-worlds not recoverable terminology. Yet 
while this body of scholarship has questioned conventional accounts of liberal history, it has 
rarely probed how and why that very convention emerged. 
Michael Freeden has developed the most systematic contextualist account of Anglo-American 
liberalism. It is, he argues, 
...that semantic field in which the political understandings of people who regard 
themselves as liberals, or who others regard as liberals, may be investigated. It is a 
plastic, changing thing, shaped and reshaped by the thought-practices of 
individuals and groups; and though it needs to have a roughly identifiable pattern 
for us to call it consistently by the same name, “liberalism,” it also presents myriad 
variations that reflect the questions posed, and the positions adopted, by various 
liberals.23 
However, even Freeden tends to blur prescriptive, comprehensive and explanatory 
arguments. Identifying Millian liberalism as the most genuine manifestation of the 
ideology, he finds several alternative strands wanting, including contemporary 
libertarianism and “American philosophical liberalism” (social liberalism following 
Rawls). With its focus on state neutrality, neo-Kantian conceptions of autonomy, and the 
possibility of specifying fixed principles of justice, as well as its abstraction from practical 
political activity, the latter represents a “decisive departure” from prevailing liberal 
thought, while the former lacks “many of the attributes which bestow on the liberal 
profile its distinctive contours,” and it is thus disqualified as “a serious contender for the 
current mantle of liberalism”.24 On this account, while liberalism contains no 
ineliminable trans-historical essence a specific thread nevertheless expresses its most 
mature “established” form. Freeden’s explicit anti-essentialism is thus qualified by 
prescriptive boundary-working methodological commitments. His general approach 
nevertheless points to a fruitful interpretive strategy. A comprehensive contextualist 
analysis of liberalism should provide a framework for grasping the diverse ways in which 
liberal languages emerge, evolve, and come into conflict with one another, rather than 
trying to distil an ahistorical set of liberal commitments from conceptual or canonical 
investigation. 
 
A Summative Conception 
Thomas Nagel is surely right to proclaim that “[i]t is a significant fact about our age that most 
political argument in the Western world now goes on between different branches of [the liberal] 
tradition”.25 This ideological victory is acknowledged by both self-proclaimed liberals and their 
critics. At the turn of the new millennium Perry Anderson protested that “[f]or the first time 
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since the Reformation there are no longer any significant oppositions – that is, systematic rival 
outlooks – within the thought-world of the West: and scarcely any on a world scale”. Writing 
more in sorrow than celebration, Raymond Geuss concurs: “we know of no other approach to 
human society that is at the same time as theoretically rich and comprehensive as liberalism and 
also even as remotely acceptable to wide sections of the population in Western societies”.26 Most 
inhabitants of the West are now conscripts of liberalism: the scope of the tradition has expanded to 
encompass the vast majority of political positions regarded as legitimate.27 Today there is little 
that stands outside the discursive embrace of liberalism in mainstream Anglo-American political 
debate (and perhaps especially in academic political theory), and most who identify themselves as 
socialists, conservatives, social democrats, republicans, greens, feminists, and anarchists, have 
been ideologically incorporated, whether they like it or not. Useful as they are for other tasks, 
stipulative and canonical protocols offer little help in interpreting this phenomenon. We thus 
need a comprehensive account that can accommodate the plurality of actually existing 
liberalisms, past and present, without smuggling in boundary-working prescriptive commitments. 
A plausible explanation, meanwhile, must unpack the dynamics of ideological conscription. This 
section introduces a comprehensive heuristic, while the remainder of the essay begins the task of 
explaining how the meaning of Anglo-American liberalism was transformed between 1850 and 
1950. 
I propose the following definition (for comprehensive purposes): the liberal tradition is constituted 
by the sum of the arguments that have been classified as liberal, and recognised as such by other self-proclaimed 
liberals, across time and space. Let us call this the summative conception. Adopting it offers several 
benefits: it can help make sense of the discursive “overextension” and elastic usage of the term, 
while avoiding unhelpful claims about pure essence or authentic form. Moreover, it forces us to 
examine traditions as evolving and contested historical phenomena, conjured into existence by 
the work of many hands, shaped by scholarly knowledge-production and pedagogical regimes, 
and often inaugurated and remade with specific politico-intellectual purposes in mind. It allows 
us to grasp, that is, the intricate dialectic of intentional human action and unintended 
consequences that structure any rich political tradition.28 
Freeden, as we have seen, characterises liberalism as “that semantic field in which the political 
understandings of people who regard themselves as liberals, or who others regard as liberals, may 
be investigated.” While I agree with most of this, it is necessary to qualify the claim about those 
“who others regard as liberals”.29 The problem here is that the term is commonly used to tar 
opponents or to create linkages between liberalism and political positions that liberals invariably 
reject. Witness the current fashion for American ultra-conservatives to connect liberalism to 
both fascism and Marxism.30 If we adopt an unqualified summative position – defining liberalism 
as the totality of positions termed liberal – then the tradition would now traverse the spectrum 
from fascism to communism, which is an implausibly expansive view. Hence the epistemic limit: 
only those positions affirmed at some point in time by groups of self-proclaimed liberals should be 
included. This allows us to map the universe of liberalism(s), though it raises another question: 
how widely held must a particular interpretation be for inclusion? Can any usage (by a self-
proclaimed liberal) expand the boundaries of liberalism? There is no simple answer to this 
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threshold question – scholars will adopt different inclusion criteria depending on their purposes 
and methodological inclinations. My own view is that to stake a claim for inclusion there must be 
sustained usage by numerous prominent ideological entrepreneurs over at least two generations. 
Otherwise, the bar for inclusion is set too low. That H.G. Wells declared himself a “liberal 
fascist” is nowhere near enough to warrant incorporating fascism into the liberal tradition, for 
barely anyone else followed him along this idiosyncratic path.31 But contra Freeden and others, 
“libertarianism” clearly meets the entry criteria. 
The temporal point is also important: I am not suggesting that only arguments labelled (and 
recognised) as liberal at Time T1 count as liberal. An argument is not expelled from the liberal 
tradition because it is later ascribed a different label or because liberals now happen to reject it. 
The tradition is constituted by the accumulation of arguments over time. Explicit justifications of 
imperialism, arguments seeking to limit suffrage on grounds of gender and racial difference, 
eugenicist attempts to “perfect” the species: all form part of the liberal tradition.32 As do 
rejections of these positions. Rather than attempting to sanitise or inoculate liberalism by 
ignoring aspects no longer considered palatable, or, more subtly, relegating those aspects to 
superseded historical circumstances while simultaneously extracting a pristine trans-historical 
core, we should recognise that liberalism has become a hyper-inflated, multifaceted, body of 
thought – a deep reservoir of ideological contradictions.  
In thinking about traditions it is productive to distinguish between the identities of agents and 
the arguments they invoke – between being an X (liberal, socialist, fascist) and employing forms 
of argument that are best characterised as X. The former is a claim about self-fashioning and the 
construction of personae, the latter about doctrine. Although this essay has focused on academic 
debates, the argument also applies to practical politics. It may well be part of the self-
understanding of an American Tea Party devotee that they are fundamentally opposed to 
liberalism, but this identity-claim does not entail that they reject arguments central to the liberal 
tradition (as construed by the summative conception). In other words, despite espousing virulent 
anti-liberalism they are nevertheless committed to paradigmatic liberal positions insofar as they 
defend (say) neo-classical economics, libertarian social policy, and the superiority of “liberal 
democratic” institutions. Within political theory, the same can be said for many self-proclaimed 
critics of liberalism, whether post-structural, critical-theoretical, republican, communitiarian, or 
conservative. 
Another consequence of adopting the summative conception is that it dissolves a familiar but 
misleading picture of traditions, which are still often conceived of as self-contained bodies of 
thought with relatively clear and stable boundaries.33 On this view, the interstitial spaces between 
established traditions are populated by hybrids – liberal-socialists, liberal-conservatives, 
Christian-realists. However, this fails to grasp the ideological miasma of modern politics, in 
which most individuals simultaneously adopt positions that are claimed by assorted traditions. 
The most hardened Tory or Republican, contemptuous of moderate “liberal-conservatives,” is 
likely to propound ideas that have long been affirmed by mainstream liberals. When looking at 
an agent who has been classified in two or more ways – say as a liberal and a conservative – this 
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could mean several different things. It might imply that one of the classifications is mistaken, or 
that they adopt a hybrid position, or alternatively that decomposing the argument will yield some 
elements that are genuinely “liberal” and others that are genuinely “conservative”. The main 
problem with these options, however, is that today it is impossible to convincingly classify values 
(such as liberty or equality) or public policies (such as free trade or democracy promotion) as 
exclusively liberal or conservative (or something else). They are – they have become – both at 
once.34  
The scholarly implications of tradition-construction can be significant, as the work of Domenico 
Losurdo demonstrates. His remarkable “counter-history” of liberalism places considerable 
emphasis on the social practices characteristic of British, Dutch and American societies.35 He 
contends that the British slave trade was at its peak in the eighteenth century, well after liberalism 
was consolidated by the settlement of 1688, and that in North America chattel slavery reached its 
apogee in the early nineteenth century, following the victory of liberalism in the War of 
Independence.36 John Locke figures heavily in both narratives. If we adopt the current 
conventional understanding of liberalism, as Losurdo does, this throws up a disturbing puzzle 
about liberal attitudes to domination, hierarchy, and exploitation, and it underpins his sweeping 
critique. The normative conclusions that Losurdo draws about contemporary liberalism are 
derived from, and are only intelligible in relation to, his interpretation of the tradition. But the 
puzzle dissolves if we adopt (for example) a Pocockian interpretation, because on that account 
neither Britain nor the United States was liberal in any meaningful sense. Interpretations of 
tradition often shape contemporary understanding as well as historical investigation.  
 
Liberalism before Locke 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the dominant prescriptive narrative about liberalism in the 
English-speaking world identified it as a product of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-
centuries, part of a cluster of ideological innovations that also included socialism. At the turn of 
the twenty-first century, the dominant narrative views it as a product of the mid-seventeenth 
century or earlier. In the former, the French and American revolutions and the global spread of 
capitalism play a starring role; in the latter, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the religious 
wars in Europe. In the former, utility, democracy, and political economy are the guiding topics; 
in the later, natural rights, the social contract, and constitutionalism. In the former, radicals like 
Jeremy Bentham take centre stage, in the latter it is almost invariably John Locke. Indeed Locke’s 
foundational role in liberalism is today a leitmotiv of political thought, promulgated by critics and 
adherents of liberalism alike. “To the extent that modern liberalism can be said to be inspired by 
any one writer”, Wolin wrote in Politics and Vision, “Locke is undoubtedly the leading candidate”. 
Stephen Holmes agrees: “The best place to begin, if we wish to cut to the core of liberalism, is 
with Locke”.37 The transition from one conception to the other tells us much about the 
                                                          
34 It follows that those values/policies are also now part of the conservative tradition (and hypothetically 
others too).  
35 Losurdo, Liberalism, trans. Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 2011). Losurdo mixes canonical and 
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36 On the problem with characterising the nineteenth-century US as liberal, see Daniel Rodgers, “The 
Traditions of Liberalism” in Questions of Tradition, ed. M.S. Phillips & Gordon Schochet (Toronto: UT 
Press, 2004), 203-33. 
37 Wolin, Politics and Vision, 263; Holmes, Passions and Constraint (Chicago: UCP, 1995), 15. Rawls’s 
“speculative” history traces liberalism to the Reformation and the sixteenth century religious wars 
(Lectures, 11). 
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trajectory of modern politics, the sociology of knowledge, and the historicity of theoretical 
categories.  
In his compelling account of American political thought John Gunnell argues that liberalism only 
became a widely recognised category of general political discourse after the First World War, and 
only assumed an important role in academic political theory in the wake of the Second World 
War. Moreover, he contends that “it was not until after 1950 that there was even any extended 
discussion of Locke as a liberal”.38 Adding a British dimension to the story complicates this 
picture. Both the conception of liberalism as a tradition rooted in early modern political thought, 
and the identification of Locke as a foundational liberal, emerged slightly earlier in Britain than in 
the US, and for different reasons. Yet despite this initial variation, British and American 
narratives converged during the ideological battles of the middle decades of the twentieth 
century, creating the vision of liberalism that dominates scholarly discourse today.  
While the term “liberal” had long been used in English to denote assorted aristocratic 
dispositions, mores, and pursuits, it only assumed a specifically political meaning in the early 
nineteenth century. Borrowed from the Spanish Liberales of the 1812 Constitution, the term was 
first employed in a derogatory manner by Tories to malign their Whig opponents. During the 
1820s it was reclaimed by some radical Whigs, in a classical example of rhetorical redescription, 
to characterise individuals and policies dedicated to non-revolutionary reform, although it also 
became associated with the small but vocal group of “philosophic radicals”, including the young 
John Stuart Mill. “Liberal” was increasingly utilised to describe the politico-economic demands 
of the emergent middle classes.39 Yet it remained a marginal category: during the 1820s and 30s 
‘“liberals’ were not a firmly defined group and ‘liberalism’ did not securely mark out a single 
intellectual phenomenon.”40 It was only during the second half of the century that usage 
proliferated, though it was closely tied to the creed of the newly-named Liberal Party.41  
Despite its increasing visibility, there was little sophisticated or thorough discussion of liberalism 
as an intellectual tradition until the early twentieth century, and even then it was rare. The main 
political theory textbook employed in Cambridge and Oxford in the late nineteenth century, 
Bluntschli’s The Theory of the State, didn’t use liberalism as an organising category, and nor did 
Sidgwick’s Development of European Polity, which replaced it in Cambridge at the turn of the 
century. It is barely visible in surveys of political thought written between the 1850s and the 
1930s.42 The effort to construct an authoritative liberal tradition only gained ground during the 
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perceived “crisis of liberalism” in the Edwardian era. Fighting acrimonious battles over the 
future of the British state, and challenged by an emergent politically-conscious labour movement, 
some liberals elaborated edifying genealogies to underwrite the ideological legitimacy of their 
cause. The most common renditions of the liberal tradition identified the transition from the 
eighteenth to the nineteenth century as the formative moment. W. Lyon Blease’s Short History of 
English Liberalism, published in 1913, was typical. A polemical defence of advanced liberalism 
written by a legal scholar, it argues that liberalism was the product of three revolutions: the 
industrial (starting in the 1760s), American and French.43  
In emphasising the Revolutionary-era origins of liberalism, the ideology was often prescriptively 
defined by a dual commitment to liberty and social equality, sometimes even democracy. This 
move excluded earlier Whig political thought. It was a constellation of ideas that could only have 
emerged after the revolutionary tumult of the late eighteenth century and the rise of a powerful 
middle class demanding political representation. In 1862, in one of the earliest detailed accounts 
of liberalism, James Fitzjames Stephen pinpointed the connection: 
As generally used…“liberal” and “liberalism”...denote in politics, and to some extent in 
literature and philosophy, the party which wishes to alter existing institutions with the 
view of increasing popular power. In short, they are not greatly remote in meaning from 
the words “democracy” and “democratic”.44  
 
Forty years later William Dunning, a prominent American historian and political theorist, argued 
that “[f]undamentally, nineteenth-century Liberalism meant democracy.”45 In an essay seeking to 
illuminate the “Historic Bases of Liberalism”, another writer distinguished liberals from Whigs 
by pointing to the aristocratic character and consequences of 1688. “In none of the great 
documents of the time,” he contended, “do you find the suggestion that the people should share 
in the work of government,” for such a conception only emerged in the wake of the French 
Revolution, and it therefore followed that liberalism could only be a product of the late 
eighteenth century.46 This view only began to lose popularity in the interwar years, though it did 
not disappear completely. In a textbook published in 1920, for example, the author declared that 
the “essence of Whiggism has always been the belief in individual liberty combined with the 
denial of social equality” and that as such “this conception is rejected by Liberals who have a far 
wider experience on which to frame their social judgements”.47 Other variants of the prescriptive 
protocol can also be discerned, including one that reduced liberalism to a species of utilitarian 
radicalism. Thus A.V. Dicey wrote in 1905 of “Benthamite individualism, which, in accordance 
with popular phraseology, may often be called conveniently liberalism”.48  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Revolution, though with philosophical roots in the seventeenth century: Political Thought in England from 
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43 Blease, Short History of English Liberalism (London: Unwin, 1913). 
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It is both striking and symptomatic that in Britain, so often seen as the incubator of liberalism, 
Locke was not widely regarded as a liberal – let alone a paradigmatic one – until nearly a century 
after liberalism emerged as an explicit political doctrine. Several generations of self-identified 
liberals somehow failed to recognise him as one of their own. While Locke’s nineteenth century 
biographers celebrated him as one of the greatest of philosophers, their verdicts on his political 
writings were far less positive. Acknowledging him as a leading Whig ideologue who exerted a 
major influence over eighteenth century political thinking, they almost invariably rejected his 
theoretical arguments as defective and obsolete.49 In so doing they painted a microcosmic picture 
of his general reputation during the Victorian age: “Locke meant the Essay” not the Treatises.50  
Most accounts of the historical development of modern political thought contended that there 
had been a radical break – both intellectual and political – at the end of the eighteenth century. A 
new world had dawned, and there was little space in it for Lockean political theory. Liberalism 
was figured as the progeny of this gestalt switch. The historicist sensibility that permeated 
nineteenth century social and political thought was antithetical to the rationalist deductions of 
Locke, and accounts of natural rights, natural law, and above all the social contract, were widely 
denigrated as primitive. The eminent legal scholar Frederick Pollock was reiterating a popular 
line of argument when he claimed that Hume had shown decisively that “even as analysis the 
mere doctrine is useless.” He concluded that Burke had been right to ridicule the contract as 
“absurd.”51 Another writer, later the M.P. for the Combined Scottish Universities, used a more 
colourful insult, scorning it as “the veriest figment of pedantic theorizing that any mystified 
scholastic ever dreamed”.52 Another common response was to historically relativize Locke’s 
work, viewing him as a man of (and trapped in) his time. Thus the idealist philosopher W.R. 
Sorley loftily declared that despite the palpable weakness of Locke’s political theory, “it served its 
purpose as a justification of the revolution settlement in accordance with the ideas of the time.”53 
Many also questioned Locke’s originality, suggesting that his main political ideas were derived 
from others, above all Hooker. As G.P. Gooch wrote in his influential account of seventeenth 
democratic thought, “there is little in Locke that he did not find in the thinkers of the 
Interregnum”.54 These lines of criticism were synthesized in the first monograph on Locke’s 
political philosophy (originally a doctoral dissertation supervised by John Dewey): “His moral 
and political philosophy may well be viewed as the summation of the best thought of the 
seventeenth century. Though he added few ideas of his own and developed the old ideas he took 
from others, he is rather the ripe fulfilment of the past than the herald of the future”. The author 
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concluded that “Locke’s theory of political society is decidedly weak” and offered little to 
contemporary political theory.55 Locke spoke from and about a lost world. 
Nineteenth century philosophers had very rarely seen Locke as a liberal or written positively 
about his political theory. John Stuart Mill’s assessment is indicative. In the System of Logic he 
praised Locke as “that truly original genius” and a hugely talented “metaphysician”, yet in the 
vast corpus of Mill’s work there are only a handful of references to Locke’s political writings.56 
His only sustained discussion is in a book review, wherein Mill follows custom in disparaging 
social contract theories and inalienable rights, while conceding that their proponents rightly 
identified the importance of limitations on government. “This is the truth,” Mill notes, “which 
was dimly shadowed forth, in howsoever rude and unskilful a manner, in the theories of the 
social compact and the rights of man”.57 On Liberty contains one passing reference to Locke, 
while James Fitzjames Stephen’s powerful riposte, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, didn’t mention him 
at all.58 Elsewhere, Stephen belittled Locke as confused and outmoded. The Second Treatise, he 
argued, 
…was in its day extremely popular, and its practical effects were no doubt great, as it 
furnished people with the best and most accessible popular justification for the 
Revolution of 1688. It would be difficult, however, to find a better illustration of the fact 
that we have travelled a very long road since Locke’s time, and have carried the 
metaphysical principles of which he perceived certain aspects, to consequences which 
have made his political speculations appear altogether superannuated and bygone. 
His conclusion was equally damning: it was worth studying once popular books “to consider the 
reasons why they now fall so flatly among us.”59  
Herbert Spencer, probably the most widely read English-language philosopher of the age, wrote 
four major works of political theory – The Proper Sphere of Government (1842), Social Statics (1851), 
The Man versus the State (1884) and Part IV (“Justice”) of The Principles of Ethics (1891) – and across 
hundreds of pages Locke was mentioned just once, when his theory of property was casually 
rejected as “unsatisfactory”.60 T. H. Green, the leading philosophical light of the final quarter of 
the century, shared Mill’s deep scepticism about the foundations of early modern political 
thought, and while he expended considerable energy grappling with Locke’s epistemological 
writings – “at once so plausible and so hollow” – he barely mentioned his political views. 
Dismissive of the state of nature, pre-political rights, and contracturalism, Green ultimately 
regarded Locke’s arguments as incoherent and he never saw him as a fellow (or proto) liberal.61 
Nor did Henry Sidgwick, who characterised Locke as a philosophically misguided Whig 
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ideologue.62 In the Edwardian era, Graham Wallace added a new post-Darwinian twist to the 
story by arguing that Locke’s “plea for a government which should consciously realise the 
purposes of God” was one of many philosophical utopias rendered irrelevant by modern 
science.63  
The same pattern of omission, disavowal and scorn emerges if we turn from political theory to 
historical scholarship. In Leslie Stephen’s important History of English Thought in the Eighteenth 
Century Locke’s ideas were relegated to a primitive past. In relativizing mode he termed Locke’s 
arguments a “formal apology of Whiggism” and grudgingly admitted that they “did well enough 
for the quiet time of the eighteenth century.” They were then comprehensively superseded: 
“That authority vanished when the French Revolution brought deeper questions for solution, 
and new methods became necessary in politics as in all other speculation”.64 Published during the 
same decade J.R. Green’s hugely popular history of England classified Locke as a Whig 
philosopher of 1688 before noting that the social contract had long been regarded as obsolete.65 
Venerated throughout Europe for his prodigious erudition, Lord Acton acknowledged that 
Locke had been a significant historical actor while assailing the quality of his political theory: 
“always reasonable and sensible, but diluted and pedestrian and poor”.66 While Acton clearly 
regarded Locke as a notable member of the “Party of Liberty,” he didn’t think of him as a 
member of the party of liberalism. In the seminal multi-volume Cambridge Modern History, planned 
by Acton before his untimely death, Locke was again credited as an influential Whig apologist, 
albeit one whose political ideas “had already been better expressed by Sidney”.67 The great F.W. 
Maitland also held a low opinion of Locke, cataloguing the many “grave faults” of Locke’s 
arguments, above all his literal belief in the historical reality of the social contract.68 Across the 
Atlantic, Locke’s reputation was barely higher. The standard history of political thought 
textbook, for example, presented a damning account of his “illogical, incoherent system of 
political philosophy”.69  
 
This widespread scepticism about the quality and relevance of Lockean political thought was 
fortified by the historicist “comparative method”, which did so much to shape scholarship 
during the late nineteenth century.70 Its proponents, the most influential of whom was Henry 
Maine, challenged deductive models of politics and sought to root the origins and development 
of customs, language, social structures, and legal forms, in long-term historical-evolutionary 
processes. Antipathetic to early modern natural law and utilitarianism alike, it provided yet 
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another weapon to attack the political thinking of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It 
exercised a profound influence on historical scholarship and the emerging social sciences – 
perhaps especially political science – on both sides of the Atlantic.71 In the locus classicus of 
comparatvism, Maine’s Ancient Law, Locke made a fleeting appearance as one of the many 
thinkers whose ideas about the state of nature and the origins of law were fundamentally 
mistaken.72 For J.R. Seeley, the leading ideologue of the late-Victorian empire, Locke’s political 
thinking was simply too ahistorical be of value, while he didn’t even warrant a mention in E.A. 
Freeman’s Comparative Politics, the first book to apply the method to the development of political 
institutions across time and space.73 
Teaching in the elite English universities reflected both Locke’s prominence as a 
“metaphysician” and his meagre reputation as a political thinker. At Oxford in the 1870s the 
Essay, though not the Treatises or Letter, was a compulsory text in moral and political 
philosophy.74 In Ritchie’s appraisal of the political science curriculum in 1891, the key authors 
are listed as Aristotle, Hobbes, Bluntschli, Maine, and Mill.75 At Cambridge, William Paley’s 
Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785) was the standard text during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. While Paley briefly paid lip-service to Locke’s historical importance, he 
ignored his arguments and rejected the social contract on utilitarian grounds. Locke’s fortunes 
didn’t improve during the closing decades of the century. When Henry Sidgwick surveyed the 
subject in the mid-1870s, Locke failed to make the list of set authors in political philosophy, 
though students were expected to be familiar with Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Hobbes, Clarke, 
Shaftesbury, Butler, Smith, Hume, Kant, Paley, Bentham, Whewell, Mill, and Grote.76 The 
History tripos paper in “Political Philosophy and General Jurisprudence” followed a familiar 
pattern. In 1875, for example, Aristotle, Guizot, Tocqueville, Mill, Gibbon, Blackstone, Austin 
and Maine, but not Locke, were listed.77  
Given Locke’s tarnished reputation at the time what are we to make of his current status as the 
ur-liberal? One possible answer is that it is based on a mistake – that Locke simply wasn’t a 
liberal.78 Another response is to insist that we have now corrected the error of earlier thinkers 
who failed to recognise Locke’s liberalism. In other words, he had either always been a liberal or 
he was never one. Both positions are defensible: it is possible to extract conflicting meanings 
from Locke’s work. But I suggest an alternative answer: Locke became a liberal during the 
twentieth century. As part of a process of retrojection his body of work – or at least some stylised 
arguments stripped from it – was posthumously conscripted to an expansive new conception of 
the liberal tradition.  
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Wars of Position: Consolidating Liberalism 
The Lockean narrative was consolidated in Britain and the US between the 1930s and the 1950s, 
as liberalism was reconfigured as the ideological other of “totalitarian” ideologies, left and right.79 
This was achieved through two key discursive moves and across two main chronological phases. 
The first move deepened the retrojective extension of the liberal tradition that had already begun 
in both Britain and the United States. The early modern account moved from being a minority 
report to the dominant narrative. The second move was, if anything, even more significant: the 
emergence and proliferation of the idea of “liberal democracy”, when intellectuals propagated an 
all-encompassing narrative that simultaneously pushed the historical origins of liberalism back in 
time while vastly expanding its spatial reach. For the first time, it was widely presented as either 
the most authentic ideological tradition of the West (a pre-1945 storyline) or the constitutive 
ideology of the West itself (a view popular after 1945). This story began to coalesce during the 
1930s, in a context of radical anxiety about the meaning and fate of liberalism. This was an era 
where, as Mussolini proclaimed, “[a]ll the political experiments of our day are anti-liberal.”80 
Liberals and their critics fought an ideological war of position, attempting to delineate the true, 
prescriptive meaning of liberalism. The narrative was cemented in the more complacent post-war 
intellectual milieu as scholars from across the political spectrum, and from assorted academic 
disciplines, converged on this new all-encompassing narrative, even as they proffered radically 
different explanations and normative evaluations of it. Strauss, Laski, Macpherson, Hartz, and 
Wolin, among others, helped to fabricate the new ideological structure. Though rarely 
acknowledged or analysed, the transformation of liberalism did not go completely unnoticed. In 
a lecture delivered in 1960, Eric Voegelin observed that “in the course of the last 30 years the 
image of what liberalism is has changed completely”.81 Wittingly or not, we are the heirs of this 
ideological labour.  
The main conceptual shift which facilitated the emergence and popularisation of the Lockean 
narrative in Britain was the conscription of Whig constitutionalism into a newly expansive 
conception of liberalism. This move was captured by de Ruggiero in 1933: “The ambitious 
designs of the radicals, curbed by the tenacious forces of tradition, fused with the older 
Whiggism to form a composite liberalism in which the old and the new were gradually integrated 
and harmonized”.82 Contra Ruggiero, however, this discursive “fusion” was largely a product of 
the twentieth century. Consequently, liberalism came to be viewed through a wide-angle lens, as 
a politico-intellectual tradition centred on individual freedom in the context of constitutional 
government. This expansion in ideological scope was also facilitated by shifts in the 
philosophical current. The eclipse of idealism in the early twentieth century, as well as powerful 
challenges to utilitarianism, helped to open up the conceptual space in which contracturalism and 
natural rights arguments could emerge from the shadows. In this new intellectual environment, 
Locke, the arch-Whig, was recast – by default as much as design – as a seminal liberal thinker 
and a source of inspiration for an individualist account of political life.  
This retrojective process began in earnest during the Edwardian years. Hobhouse’s Liberalism, 
arguably the most comprehensive discussion of liberal political theory published during the first 
half of the century, played an important role in establishing the lineaments of the (new) Lockean 
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tradition.83 He posited the emergence of liberalism as coeval with the development of the early 
modern English state. In its original Whig iteration – a theory of the “Natural Order” centred on 
inalienable prepolitical rights and the restraint of government – it embodied a “negative” form of 
constitutionalism that sought to eliminate obstacles to human progress. “It finds humanity 
oppressed, and would set it free”. But, Hobhouse continued, the underlying theoretical 
architecture was fundamentally flawed, and only during the nineteenth century was a positive 
dimension added, first by utilitarians and more recently by “new liberals”.84 Thus Hobhouse 
presented the Whigs as pioneer liberals, albeit now superseded. In addition to providing fellow 
liberal reformers with a powerful constitutionalist genealogy, he had another good reason for 
stretching the discursive boundaries of liberalism, as he was engaged in the attempt to craft a 
liberal socialist politics to replace the desiccated “old liberalism” of the “Manchester School” and 
the Benthamites.85 Yet this Lockean narrative, a precursor of things to come, remained marginal 
until the 1930s, and scholarly and popular discussions of liberalism were most commonly tied to 
the quotidian concerns of the often-embattled Liberal party.86 When R.G. Collingwood wrote the 
translator’s preface for Ruggiero’s History of European Liberalism in 1927, he still felt it necessary to 
inform his audience that the book addressed liberalism in the “continental” not the “British” 
sense, as a “name for principles of constitutional liberty and representative government,” rather 
than a party ideology.87  
 
The First World War and its aftermath also saw early attempts to self-consciously define an 
American form of liberalism with its roots in the seventeenth century. Progressive scholars and 
publicists took the lead.88 The critic Harold Stearn was one of the first. He drew heavily on 
Hobhouse’s account of the true meaning of liberalism, but his historical narrative had a different 
emphasis, focusing in particular on religious toleration and the catalytic role of Roger Williams, 
the seventeenth century Protestant theologian and colonist.89 Despite dedicating a chapter to 
“what liberalism is” and another to the “English heritage” of American liberalism, he never 
mentioned Locke. Interpreting liberalism as an ideology centred on religious toleration become a 
popular theme in American scholarship, exemplified by Vernon Parrington’s hugely influential 
Main Currents in American Thought, published in the late 1920s though composed largely in the 
1910s.90 Parrington argued that liberalism was developed originally in the natural law theories 
propounded by the early Puritan settlers, who had been transplanted from a European 
environment inhospitable to their radical claims into a welcoming new world in America, where 
liberalism could truly flourish. Though Parrington stressed the centrality of Williams – “England 
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gave us her best”91 – he also assigned Locke a prominent role. The connection between 
liberalism and toleration helped open the door for placing Locke at the centre of the tradition. 
Thus whereas parliamentary constitutionalism was central to the British appropriation of Locke 
(via the retrojection of the Whigs), it was religious toleration (via the retrojection of key elements 
of Puritanism) which did much of the ideological labour in the United States.  
 
By 1918, some of the key building blocks were in place, but the ultimate hegemony of the 
Lockean narrative was still far from guaranteed, and it required a series of political and 
intellectual moves to produce it. The discursive consolidation of this extensive new account of 
liberalism was a product of the complex interweaving of geopolitical dynamics and disciplinary 
imperatives within the human sciences, especially political science and history. Indeed the 
academic disciplines which profess to instruct us about the nature of liberalism played a 
fundamental role in its transfiguration. The shift unfolded in the context of a transfer of 
scholarly authority from Britain to the US. Whereas British commentators had shaped the 
contours of interpretation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, exerting a 
profound influence (alongside German scholarship) on the development of American political 
science and history, by 1945 a decisive shift across the Atlantic was apparent. The new liberal 
narrative was thus largely a product of the US human sciences, though it was mirrored in Britain. 
The change in meaning is captured in the evolution of George Sabine’s influential conspectus of 
western political thought, which was one of the first major scholarly texts to discuss liberalism in 
detail. The first edition, published in 1937, rooted its origins squarely in nineteenth-century 
Britain, figuring it as a distinct ideology positioned between socialism and conservatism. (Locke 
was not characterised as a liberal). Moreover, like so many of his contemporaries, Sabine worried 
that liberalism “was a diminishing force in modern society”.92 In the revised edition of 1951, 
however, his account of liberalism was both more capacious and more confident, and he asserted 
that it now had two main senses. The first, which he associated with Fascist and Marxist critics, 
saw it as the “social philosophy of the industrial middle class” and thus coterminous with laissez 
faire capitalism. Rejecting this critique, he endorsed a far broader account of liberalism as both 
the “culmination” of Western history and largely synonymous with democracy.93 Here he 
followed political theorist Frederick Watkins, who had recently celebrated liberalism as the 
“secular form of Western civilization” and the “modern embodiment of all the characteristic 
traditions of Western politics”.94 Sabine concurred: “political liberalism has been deeply 
implicated in the whole development of Western culture”.95 (The ultimately unsuccessful attempt 
to retroject liberalism back into the ancient Greek world, thus making it coterminous with 
Western civilization, was one of the signature ideological moves of the era.)96 An irony appears 
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lost on Sabine. Whereas linking democracy and liberalism had, in the nineteenth century, served 
to delimit its chronological scope, it was now employed to buttress the claim that liberalism was 
the spiritual inheritance of the West itself.  
Confusion reigned. As liberalism’s boundaries were conceptually stretched, so whatever fragile 
coherence it once had was lost. In the mid-1930s Dewey observed that “liberalism has meant in 
practice things so different as to be opposed to one another,” and it only got worse. 97 A decade 
later a noted philosopher could insouciantly observe that “we, too, have our ‘ideology,’ inherited 
from the past as the liberal tradition, the American creed, the Judeo-Christian heritage of 
Western civilization or the like.”98 For many, these ideas had become interchangeable. The 
tendency to construct legitimating genealogies for ideological purposes provoked the ire of a 
young C.B. Macpherson, who complained that too many scholars plotting the history of western 
philosophy substituted serious analysis with assertions of political faith, “using their history to 
show how long and honourable an ancestry that faith has”.99 A new piece of conceptual 
technology was added when the term “neo-liberalism” was coined in the late 1930s. During the 
last thirty years, it has served as shorthand for the valorisation of the minimal state and 
deregulated market, but (to add to the confusion) it was originally utilised to identify a desirable 
via media between unrestrained capitalism and progressive statism.100 Commentators grumbled 
endlessly about the theoretical muddle. One frustrated scholar marvelled in 1948 that “[o]ne 
finds the term employed to defend everything from classical economics to the Soviet 
interpretation of communism.”101 In 1955 Reinhold Niebuhr addressed the “confusion”, arguing 
that liberalism had come to denominate both a phase of human history, “the rise of a modern 
technical society availing itself of democratic political forms and of capitalistic economic 
institutions”, and a specific set of partisan political commitments. It also signified two 
“contradictory” claims, namely that liberty necessitated both the unleashing of capitalism and its 
radical restraint.102  
 
A similar pattern can be discerned in Britain. The translation of de Ruggiero’s History of European 
Liberalism and the publication of Laski’s The Rise of European Liberalism fortified the early modern 
liberal narrative.103 It became the norm during the 1930s and 1940s.104 Sceptical of claims about 
seamless continuity, Isaiah Berlin summed up the nature and ideological appeal of what had 
become a popular position by 1950: “European liberalism wears the appearance of a single 
coherent movement, little altered during almost three centuries, founded upon relatively simple 
foundations, laid by Locke or Grotius or even Spinoza; stretching back to Erasmus and 
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Montaigne, the Italian Renaissance, Seneca and the Greeks”.105 By the early 1960s Kenneth 
Minogue, a young theorist at the LSE, could confidently assert that liberalism was a “single and 
continuing entity...so extensive that it involves most of the guiding beliefs of modern western 
opinion” and that John Locke was its “founding father”.106  
The new historical narrative was adopted by both critics and celebrants of liberalism. Converging 
on description, they diverged in both explanation and normative evaluation. From the left, for 
example, Laski depicted liberalism as an ideology with foundations bored deep into the bedrock 
of western history: “liberalism has been, in the last four centuries, the outstanding doctrine of 
Western civilization”. It supplied the ideological scaffolding of modern capitalism, and 
unsurprisingly Locke now played a starring role as the “most representative prophet” of the new 
age.107 This line of critique reappeared in the work of Laski’s student Macpherson and is still 
popular today.108 On the political right, meanwhile, Strauss, Voegelin, and others, also pressed 
variations on the early modern theme. Self-proclaimed liberals were only too happy to vaunt the 
robust durability and deep roots of their creed, bolstering its ideological armature in the face of 
hostile competition. Narrative convergence helped produce discursive hegemony. It was against 
this imposing – but quite new – ideological edifice that the contextualist scholars of the 1960s 
fought their rear-guard action. 
Arguably, the most significant conceptual move of the interwar era was the emergence of the 
idea of “liberal democracy”. Barely visible before 1930, in the ensuing decade it began to 
supplant existing appellations for Euro-Atlantic states.109 During the 1940s and 1950s it became a 
commonplace.110 As a global conflict over the proper meaning of democracy raged, the modifier 
“liberal” simultaneously encompassed diverse representative parliamentary systems while 
differentiating them from others claiming the democratic title, above all Italy, Germany, and the 
Soviet Union. As Ernest Barker observed the year after Hitler assumed power, the “issue of our 
time is hardly a simple issue of democracy versus dictatorship. Dictatorship itself claims the 
quality of democracy; indeed it claims the quality of a higher, a more immediate, spontaneous 
democracy”. This was, then, a clash between “two types of democracy – the parliamentary 
type…and the dictatorial type.”111 Liberal democracy was the name increasingly adopted to cover 
the former in its conflicts against the latter. Social scientists soon began to utilise the concept, 
usage that was refined and normalised after 1945. By 1954 Quincy Wright could assert 
confidently that the concept of “liberal democracy” originated in sixteenth century Europe, 
especially in England, and was powerfully articulated in Locke’s political philosophy.112 The 
                                                          
105 Berlin, “Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century”, Foreign Affairs, 28 (1950), 357. 
106 Minogue, The Liberal Mind (London: Methuen, 1962), vii, 2. 
107 Laski, Rise of European Liberalism, 9, 115. 
108 Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962); Losurdo, Liberalism.  
109 E.g., M. Parmlees, “Liberal Democracy, Fascism, and Bolshevism,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 180 (1935), 47-54; J.A. Leighton, Social Philosophies in Conflict (NYC: Appleton, 
1937); Alfred Zimmern (ed.), Modern Political Doctrines (Oxford: OUP, 1939), xiv-xix; Crossman, 
Government, 286-7, 294-6; J.A. Hobson, “Thoughts on our Present Discontents,” Political Quarterly, 9 
(1938), 47-57; E.H. Carr, The Twenty Year’s Crisis, 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan, 1939), 37. See 
Oakeshott, Doctrines, xvi-xix, for sceptical acknowledgement of the linguistic shift. 
110 A google Ngram graph shows this post-1930 spike in usage: 
http://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=liberal+democracy&year_start=1800&year_end=2000
&corpus=0&smoothing=3. Google Scholar also offers illustrative evidence. Scrubbed of false positives, 
the term “liberal democracy” is employed with the following frequency: 1900-1910 - 6; 1911-1920 - 33; 
1921-1930 - 24; 1931-1940 - 143; 1941-1950 - 216; 1951-1960 - 374. 
111 Barker, “Democracy since the War and its Prospects for the Future”, International Affairs, 13 (1934), 
757. On the threat, see Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself (NYC: Norton, 2013). 
112 Wright, “International Law and Ideologies,” American Journal of International Law, 48 (1954), 619.  
  21 
Lockean narrative was thus frequently generalized into a broader claim about the Lockean-liberal 
character of Anglo-American societies, an interpretive strategy popularised by Louis Hartz and 
that was to have a profound effect on the emergent subfield of comparative politics.113 
Conjoining “liberal” to democracy automatically (and vastly) expanded the scope of those 
purportedly encompassed by liberalism, as supporters of “liberal democracy” were conscripted, 
however reluctantly, to the liberal tradition. Liberalism was thus transfigured from a term 
identifying a limited and contested position within political discourse to either the most authentic 
expression of the western tradition or a constitutive feature of the West itself. Again, this 
conceptual shift was rarely acknowledged, though it didn’t pass completely unremarked. Strauss 
noted the peculiarity, and the “serious difficulty” for interpretation, that resulted from the “fact 
that here and now liberalism and conservatism have a common basis; for both are based here 
and now on liberal democracy, and therefore both are antagonistic to Communism”.114  
The political instrumentalization of intellectual history was widespread across the Euro-Atlantic 
world, reaching its reductio ad absurdum in Bertrand Russell’s claim that “[a]t the present time 
Hitler is an outcome of Rousseau; Roosevelt and Churchill, of Locke”.115 It is thus unsurprising 
that history provided another disciplinary space for propagating the new vision of liberalism. The 
“history of ideas”, an emergent field combining  history and philosophy that “rose like a new 
sign in the zodiac over large areas of American culture and education”, was, like political theory, 
transformed by émigré scholars, including Hans Baron, Ernst Cassirer, Felix Gilbert, Raymond 
Klibansky, Paul Kristeller, Hajo Holborn, and Erwin Panofsky.116 Its zealous proponents helped 
to define and defend a holistic “Western” civilization based on “liberal” values, and as such it 
was of “strategic” value in fighting totalitarianism.117 As the classroom became as powerful 
vector for the transmission of the new liberal-civilizational creed, so the Journal of the History of 
Ideas, founded in 1940, served as the principal venue for its scholarly elaboration. It is no 
coincidence that it was the only academic journal to receive a secret subsidy from the CIA-
sponsored Congress on Cultural Freedom.118 University curricula, then, provided institutional 
authority for the transvaluation of liberalism. “Western civilization” courses, which flourished 
from the end of the First World War until the 1960s, popularised “an interpretation of history 
that gives the United States a common development with England and Western Europe and 
identifies this ‘civilization’ with the advance of liberty and culture”. Helping to construct a 
mythopoeic narrative of the West as simultaneously ancient and modern, free and strong, they 
were the most widely taught history courses after the Second World War.119 While claims about 
the intellectual coherence, historical continuity, and ethico-political superiority of “the West” 
stretched back at least as far as the eighteenth century, it was only in the mid-twentieth century 
that this potent civilizational narrative came to be routinely classified as liberal. The victorious 
spread of liberalism and the rise of the West came to be seen as one and the same thing. 
 
Conclusion: Conscripts of Liberalism 
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The nature of liberalism has been a core concern in political theory since its advent as an 
academic specialism in the early twentieth century. In this essay I have criticised some prominent 
approaches to interpreting liberalism, introduced some methodological tools for thinking about 
the proliferation of liberal languages, and sketched an explanatory account of shifts in the 
meaning of liberalism in the Anglo-American world. The analysis has implications for both 
political theorists and historians. Above all, it suggests the need to be alert to the historical 
contingency and variability of our theoretical vocabularies and the power dynamics of tradition-
construction. It also calls into question the general utility of “liberalism” as a category of political 
analysis. Current debates about the nature of liberalism – in and beyond political theory – are 
often distorted because of the ahistorical understanding of liberal ideology that they invoke. 
Conducted in a discursive echo-chamber, they are often marked by a symptomatic form of 
collective amnesia, a problematic erasure of the political and intellectual dynamics that generated 
much of what is now articulated as scholarly common sense.  
This essay is intended as a modest contribution to the work of historical recovery. As Stephen 
wrote in 1862, “[t]he words ‘liberal’ and ‘liberalism’, like all other such phrases, derive a great part 
of their significance from the time they were invented”.120 The history of liberalism, though, is a 
history of constant reinvention. The most sweeping of these occurred in the middle of the 
twentieth century, when liberalism was increasingly figured as the dominant ideology of the West 
– its origins retrojected back into the early modern era, it came to denote virtually all non-
totalitarian forms of politics as well as a partisan political perspective within societies. This was 
partly a consequence of the delegitimation of political extremes, partly a result of the vicissitudes 
of domestic political strife, and partly a result of political and conceptual labour performed in to 
the developing human sciences. Karl Popper once referred to The Open Society and its Enemies as 
his “war effort”, a contribution to the fight against totalitarianism. The construction of Lockean 
liberalism was a grander, more all-encompassing variation on the same theme. 
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